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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
ON PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
1. Did the per curiam decision of the court violate 
established standards of review for summary judgments or intend 
to overrule all prior decisions for the review of summary judg-
ments? 
2. Will public policy and the cases cited support the per 
curiam decision? 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE PER CURIAM DECISION WITH RESPECT TO WHICH RECONSIDERATION 
"TS SOUGHT VIOLATES ESTABLISHED STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND OVERRULES ALL PRIOR 
DECISIONS FOR REVIEW OF SUMMARY JUDGMENTS 
With all due respect to the court, the per curiam decision 
contains very serious mischaracterizations of the record, is 
internally inconsistent and appears to be based on deviations 
from the record and numerous misstatements. Beginning with the 
first sentence of the decision, the court characterizes the 
document in controversy as an "agreement"; the question of 
whether an agreement exists is the ultimate issue in controversy. 
In the second sentence of the first paragraph of page 2 of 
the decision, the court again characterizes the document as an 
_ i _ 
agreement. Thereafter, the court continuously refers to the 
document at issue as an "agreement11. The nature of the document 
is the ultimate factual issue in this case and the decision 
demonstrates that the court is not construing the evidence of the 
appellants as fact or in the light most favorable to the appel-
lants. This apparent reversal of the established standard of 
review for summary judgments will lead the bar to confusion as a 
dramatic change in Utah law. 
Factual issues do exist: (1) McCoy testified in his deposi-
tion that the blank form is not an agreement to pay a commission, 
that no commission was discussed and that the form was signed as 
requested by the respondents only as a precondition to place a 
sign on the building; and (2) McCoy's deposition, the responses 
to requests for admissions and notes of respondent's agent 
(Christensen) show no commission agreement was reached or dis-
cussed in direct conflict with respondents' testimony. The court 
finds that the appellants were at fault for failing to file 
counter affidavits to respondentsf affidavit in support of 
summary judgment. McCoy's testimony (cited by the court) raises 
the issue of whether the parties intended to enter any contractu-
al relationship. 
Under prior law, this court must view the evidence before it 
"Christensen met several more times with McCoy, and accord-
ing to McCoy, in July of 1984, McCoy executed plaintiffs' 
exclusive listing agreement." 
o 
in the light most favorable to appellants. Under the former 
standard, the statements of McCoy are considered as fact. If 
McCoy's statements are fact, there can be no agreement. 
The court can construe the agreement as a matter of law 
3 
where the contract terms are complete, clear, and unambiguous. 
The contract terms here are not complete; nothing could be more 
incomplete than a blank duration in a listing agreement, particu-
larly where the real estate agent admittedly failed to inform the 
consumer that the blank duration means that the listing could be 
revoked at any time. 
POINT II. 
PUBLIC POLICY AND THE CASES CITED BY THE COURT 
DO NOT SUPPORT THE DECISION 
All of the cases cited by the court are cases where factual 
issues required a trial to determine what the blanks in the 
document in controversy should mean in view of the intent of the 
parties. 
The court relies on its earlier decision in Tavlor Nat., 
2
 See Kidman v. White, 378 P.2d 898 (Utah 1963); Amjacs 
Interwest, Inc. v. Design Associates, 635 P.2d 53 (Utah 
1981); Tangren v. Ingalls, 367 P.2d 179 (Utah 1961); Jensen 
v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 611 P.2d 363 (Utah 
vmr. 
3 
See Per curiam decision, at page 1, 1(2, citing Colonial 
Leasing v. Larsen Bros., 49 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (December 22, 
1986). 
o 
Inc. v. Jensen Bros. Const. Co. (an appeal after trial), for the 
proposition that the absence of a specified duration in a listing 
agreement is not sufficient to render it unenforceable. The case 
stands for the proposition that, where the evidence presented at 
trial shows a meeting of the minds and a clear intent to con-
tract, the term of the agreement can be determined at trial. The 
Taylor decision is replete with references to the evidence 
"adduced at trial11 to support the agreement. 
Chumnev v. Stout, holds a broker earns a commission if a 
valid agreement exists when the listed propert3/ is sold to a 
party not procured by the broker. Appellants agree with Chumnev, 
but in this case there is no agreement. 
Chumney was based in large part on Andreason v. Hansen, 
wherein the court stated: 
[I]t is to be kept firmly in mind, that the 
courts recognize the rights of parties freely 
to contract and are extremely reluctant to do 
anything which will fail to give full recogni-
tion to such rights. [Emphasis added] 
It is the position of appellants no agreement was reached. 
641 P.2d 150 (Utah 1982) 
14 Utah 2d 202, 381 P.2d 84 (1963) 
8 Utah 2d 370, 335 P.2d 404 (1959) 
See Appendix, Item 1, Deposition of Michael McCoy. McCoy, 
who signed the blank form, was not authorized by the corpor-
ate general partner, nor by the limited partnership, to 
enter into such an agreement. 
/. 
The per curiam decision denies appellants the opportunity to 
present evidence to a trier of fact to have the intent of the 
parties weighed and determined. 
In Chumney, as in the Taylor case, a decision was rendered 
after trial. Appellants urge reconsideration because the evi-
dence is in conflict, no trial was held, the duration of the 
document is blank, the evidence shows a specific lack of intent 
to contract, and no trier of fact has considered the issue of the 
respondents representations, or lack thereof, as to a "meeting of 
the minds". 
o 
The court relies upon Faulkner v. Farnsworth, and Docutel 
Q 
Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Brady Systems, Inc.; this reliance is 
misplaced. 
Faulkner, supra, was a contract dispute which had previously 
been remanded for trial after summary judgment was granted. 
The more recent Faulkner decision was before the court on the 
issue of the propriety of an award of attorney's fees after trial 
on the merits. 
Docutel, supra, was a contract dispute on which terms of an 
714 P.2d 1149 (Utah 1986). 
48 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Dec. 22, 1986). 
665 P.2d 1292 (Utah 1983). 
8 
9 
10 
inconsistent contract control. 
The cases relied upon by the court in affirming the lower 
court are not appropriate or applicable where summary judgment 
was granted. 
A strong underlying public policy for the establishment of 
the State of Utah Division of Real Estate is protection of the 
public. Substantial penalties are imposed on real estate agents 
and brokers who violate licensing procedures and requirements 
because of the quasi-legal practice aspects of the use of 
forms. The type of form used here falls within the ambit of 
the Statute of Frauds, not the less restrictive common law of 
contracts. 
The rationale behind this public policy is quite simple. It 
is designed to promote explicit, fair practices in the real 
12 
estate business. It is specifically designed to prevent a 
party from being compelled by incomplete, false or misleading 
statements to be held liable for a contract which he never 
See Utah Code Annotated, §§ 61-2-11, 61-2-12 and 61-2-17 
(1953, as amended). 
See, e.g., Milholin v. Vorhies, 320 N.W.2d 552 (Iowa 1982); 
Red Carpet-Barry & Assoc, v. Apex Associates, 635 P.2d 1224 
(Ariz.App. 1981) ; Olson v. Neale, 570 P.2d 209 (Ariz.App. 
1977); Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980). 
c 
A 1 3 
made. 
Under established rules of interpretation, ambiguous con-
tracts must be construed against the party drafting the document. 
The form in controversy here is a standard listing form used by 
real estate brokers who can now enforce blank agreements without 
a trial if the per curiam decision is allowed to stand. The law 
is that the broker shall be deemed the author of the document.1" 
CONCLUSION 
The decision as entered is manifestly unjust in that it 
fails to construe an incomplete contract against the author and 
imposes upon appellants substantial liability without allowing a 
determination by a trier of fact on the conflicting evidence as 
to the ultimate issue of the intent of the parties to contract. 
Respectfully submitted this 13th day of February, 1987. 
KAPALOSKI, KINGHORN & PETERS 
Attorneys for Appellants 
13 
14 
"A fixed and definite time limit also protects the property 
owner, by precluding the broker from claiming a commission 
on any sale that occurs after the expiration of the time 
limit. Caldwell v. Consol. Realty & Management Co., 668 
P.2d 284, 287 (Nev. 1983). 
See Insurance Agencies Co. v. Weaver, 604 P.2d 258 (Ariz. 
1779nnCaldwell v. Consol. Realty & Management Co., 668 P.2d 
284 (Nev. 1983). 
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Examina t ion (By Mr. Olsen) 36 
1 ag reement which i s D e p o s i t i o n E x h i b i t 4, would t h e s a l e s 
2 p r i c e of t h e b u i l d i n g have been $ 5 , 8 5 7 , 0 0 0 ? 
3 A. Y e s . 
4 Q. Was any commission paid on that sale? 
5 A. Yes, there was. 
6 Q. To whom and in what amount? 
7 A. The individuals were Mike Parsons, Ty Winfield, 
8 and I'm not sure of the other party or the amounts. 
9 Q. Do you have a closing statement for the 
10 t r a n s a c t i o n ? 
11 A. I do n o t , n o . Mr. Kinghorn might h a v e . 
12 MR. OLSEN: J e r r y , do you have a c l o s i n g s t a t e m e n t 
13 we could look a t ? 
14 MR. KINGHORN: I d o n ' t have one w i t h me. I t 
15 d o e s n ' t show any commiss ions , however . I ' l l p r o v i d e them 
16 t o y o u . 
17 I t d o e s n ' t show any commiss ion, b u t when I come i n 
18 t o q u e s t i o n Mr. McCoy a f t e r you g e t t h r o u g h I ' l l c l a r i f y 
19 t h a t . 
20 Q. (BY MR. OLSEN) Do you recall the approximate 
21 amount of the commission? 
22 A. There was a commission negotiated by Mr. Doms on 
23 the entire purchase price of the property. I don't recall 
24 the exact amount, but only a portion of it was paid at the 
25 time of closing. 
Examina t ion (By Mr. Olsen) 37 
Q. Do you r e c a l l what t h e commission on t h e e n t i r e 
p r o p e r t y was, o r an a p p r o x i m a t e amount of t h e commiss ion? 
A. I b e l i e v e i t was i n t h e q u a r t e r of a m i l l i o n 
d o l l a r s r a n g e . I d o n ' t "know t h e s p e c i f i c f i g u r e . 
Q. D i r e c t i n g your a t t e n t i o n t o D e p o s i t i o n E x h i b i t 1 
which i s a s a l e s agency c o n t r a c t , ! w h e n d i d you s i g n t h a t 
document? 
A. T h e r e ' s no d a t e on t h e document . I b e l i e v e i t was 
in J u l y of 1984 . I d o n ' t r e c a l l a s p e c i f i c d a t e . 
Q. In t h e t h e Request fo r Admiss ion se rved upon you , 
you deny t h e e x i s t e n c e of a c o n t r a c t r e l a t i n g t o t h e s a l e s 
agency agreement? 
A. Yes . 
Q. Let me in particular refer you to the Request for 
Admissions and your reply. The request reads — this is 
Request Number 4. "Admit that during the term of the 
contract defendant Domcoy Investors V sold or leased or 
exchanged the property to a third party." 
The response is denied and in parentheses, "The 
defendants deny that a contract existed between the 
plaintiffs and defendants. The Domcoy Investors V project 
was sold on December 31st 1984." Do you deny the existence 
of a contract? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. Why is that? 
Examination (By Mr. Olsen) 38 
1 I A. Because at the time that my signature was placed 
2 on this sheet of paper, it was merely to allow Gump & Ayers 
:o place a sign on the building as a leasing agent. There 
4 were no specifics discussed as far as in terms of a listing, 
5 sales price, term of lease, or anything like that. In fact, 
6 decisions had not been made as to how the building was to 
7 be marketed from a lease standpoint. 
8 We had in the past entertained offers as far as 
9 lease of space from other real estate firms; had granted, 
10 you know, exclusive listings for single parties, like that. 
11 It was our intent to allow Gump & Ayers to place a 
12 sign on the building. 
13 Q. For what purpose? 
14 A. So that they could take referrals as far as 
15 potential tenants for the building. Prior contact had been 
16 made through either our architect or the builders working 
17 on the building. 
18 Q. Did you have discussions with Gump & Ayers 
19 regarding this fact, that you didn't think that, regarding 
20 your understanding of the sales agency contract? 
21 A. At a previous discussion Mr. Dans had stated that 
22 that if they wanted to put a sign on the building that was 
23 fine, but — and it was our intent that until we had more 
24 concrete evidence as to how we were going to market it and 
25 such and a marketing proposal for leasing was set up, that 
Examina t ion (By Mr. 01sen) 39 
1 I t h i s was t o p l a c e a s i g n on t h e b u i l d i n g and e n t e r t a i n , you 
2 know, on a case^y~-~caseT b a s i s what t h e — you know, i f t h e 
3 t e n a n t was i n t e r e s t e d , and s ee i f some s o r t of a l e a s e 
4 c o u l d be worked o u t . 
5 Q. I f a l e a s e could h a v e been worked o u t in t h a t 
6 s c e n a r i o , would a commission have been p a i d t o Gump & Ayers? 
7 A. Y e s . 
8 Q. Did you discuss the possibility of sales of floors 
9 or a portion of the building? 
10 A. We had made Gump & Ayers aware that the building 
11 had been condcminiumized or was in the process of being 
12 condominiumized, and I believe at one time Ron Christensen 
13 had stated that — would we entertain the sale of the 
14 entire building; and we had said we'd entertain an offer on 
15 either condominium space or the sale of the entire building, 
16 but we weren't in a position to make any specific 
17 determinations as to what price, what amount, or whatever. 
18 Q. If you accepted an offer under that scenario, 
19 would you contemplate that a commission would have been 
20 paid to Gump & Ayers? 
21 A. If Gump & Ayers brought — brought us somebody to 
22 buy a floor of the building or the whole building, or to 
23 lease a space, a commission would be negotiated as it would 
24 be with any of the other leasing agents that had previously 
25 brought us individuals that had been interested and we had 
E x a m i n a t i o n (By Mr. O l s e n ) 40 
1 g i v e n e x c l u s i v e s i n g l e p a r t y l i s t i n g s t o . 
2 Q. Would t h e c o m m i s s i o n h a v e b e e n s i x p e r c e n t o f t h e 
3 s a l e , l e a s e , o r e x c h a n g e p r i c e ? 
4 A. I b e l i e v e t h a t would h a v e — u n l e s s i t was — 
5 u n l e s s i t was n e g o t i a t e d a t t h e t i m e o f , y o u know, t h e 
6 o f f e r b e i n g p r e s e n t e d t o u s , I b e l i e v e s i x p e r c e n t was — 
7 i t ' s t h e f i g u r e l i s t e d i n t h i s — i t ' s t h e o n e f i g u r e t y p e d 
8 i n t o t h i s p i e c e — on t h i s p i e c e o f p a p e r . S i x p e r c e n t i s 
9 a n o r m a l c o m m i s s i o n t o be p a i d i n s o m e t h i n g l i k e t h a t . 
10 Q. Okay . Mr. McCoy, i f you w o u l d — I ' d l i k e you t o 
11 t a k e y o u r t i m e , b u t I ' d l i k e y o u t o t e l l me e a c h and e v e r y 
12 f a c t upon w h i c h y o u ' r e b a s i n g y o u r j u d g m e n t t h a t you a r e 
13 n o t o b l i g a t e d t o p a y a c o m m i s s i o n u n d e r t h i s s a l e s a g e n c y 
14 c o n t r a c t w h i c h h a s b e e n m a r k e d a s D e p o s i t i o n E x h i b i t 1 . 
15 A. The p r i m a r y r e a s o n i s b e c a u s e t o me t h e r e ' s no 
16 b e g i n n i n g d a t e , t h e r e ' s no e n d i n g d a t e , t h e r e ' s no t e r m , 
17 t h e r e ' s no p r i c e o r a n y t h i n g l i s t e d on t h e s h e e t o f p a p e r , 
18 and a s s u c h u n d e r C a l i f o r n i a l aw i t w o u l d n o t b e a b i n d i n g 
19 l i s t i n g a g r e e m e n t , b e c a u s e u n d e r C a l i f o r n i a l a w w h e r e 
20 t h e r e ' s no b e g i n n i n g d a t e and no s p e c i f i e d p e r i o d o f 
21 l i s t i n g , an a g e n c y a g r e e m e n t i s u n e n f o r c e a b l e . 
22 I d o n ' t t h i n k t h e r e ' s a v a l i d c o n t r a c t on t h e f a c e 
23 o f t h e d o c u m e n t , so i t was m e r e l y s o m e t h i n g t h a t we s i g n e d 
2 4 so t h a t t h e y c o u l d p l a c e a s i g n on t h e b u i l d i n g . 
25 Q. And w h a t was t h e p u r p o s e o f t h e s i g n on t h e 
Examination (By Mr. Olsen) 41 
1 building: to attract interest? 
2 A. To channel interest to someone who could then 
3 refer potential tenants to us. 
4 i Q. Are there any other facts upon which you rely to 
5 support your judgment that there is no contract or 
6 agreement relating to a commission? 
7 A. I'd say just the overall dealings with Gump & 
8 Ayers and other real estate companies that we had signed 
9 exclusive single party listings with. 
10 During that period of time we were unclear as to 
11 what could be done in the way of providing benefits for 
12 potential tenants and what we really wanted to do, what was 
13 the best way of dealing with the leasing up of the building, 
14 and we had hired a law firm in California to do research on 
15 this specific issue, and it wasn't until several months 
16 later that any type of specific conclusions were made by 
17 this law firm. 
18 Q. You testified that you signed the agreement in 
19 roughly July of 1984? 
20 A. To the best of my knowledge, yes. 
21 Q. And at that time you understood that Gump & Ayers 
22 would place a sign on the building? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. Was there a sign on the building prior to the time 
25 the sales agency contract was signed by you? 
Examination (By Mr. Olsen) 42 
1 A. I don't recall. 
2 MR. OLSEN: Let me talk — let1s go off the record 
3 and let me talk with my client and I think that will 
4 probably finish my questions. 
5 (There was a short break taken.) 
6 
7 EXAMINATION 
8 BY MR. KINGHORN: 
9 Q. Mr. McCoy, earlier in the deposition you were 
10 asked some questions about the history of your experience 
11 with land development. Were your answers based on your 
12 best recollection about the times or the entities or the 
13 names of the purchasers? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. Could there be deviations in dates or entities 
16 based on your incomplete recollection of those details at 
17 this time? 
18 A. Yes, there could be. 
19 Q. And your answers were intended to be general, and 
20 you believe they1re generally correct? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. All right. With reference to the sale of the 
23 Sterling Building in December of 1984 and specifically the 
24 terms of Deposition Exhibit Number 4, is there a mechanism 
25 in that agreement for the purchase price to be adjusted; 
Examination (By Mr. Kinghorn) 43 
specifically, based on the tax credits ultimately obtained 
by the buyers and the balance due to Albuquerque Federal on 
the construction loan? 
A. Yes, there is. 
Q. So that the purchase price could be somewhat less 
than the amount stated on the first page of the document? 
A. Yes, it could be. 
Q. Mr. McCoy, were you authorized by Dcmcoy 
Enterprises to enter into a listing agreement with Gump & 
Ayers to sell the building? 
A. There had been no specific authorization of that, 
no. 
Q. When you executed Deposition Exhibit 1, did you 
intend to enter a listing agreement with Gump & Ayers which 
would bind Domcoy or the limited partnership to pay a 
commission upon the sale of the building? 
A. No. 
Q. Did Mr. Christensen tell you specifically that 
Exhibit 1 was only to allow Gump & Ayers to place or 
maintain the sign on the building? • 
A. I don't recall if it specifically stated that, but 
in our conversation over lunch on — during the meeting we 
had signing this thing, that was the impression that I got. 
Q. Was that the prime purpose in your mind for 
executing the document? 
